Volume 22

Issue 6

Article 8

1976

The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections
Thomas Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Martin, The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 Vill. L. Rev. 1214 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss6/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Martin: The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections

[VOL. 22

Comment
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS
OSHA INSPECTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA),' which has been characterized as the "most all encompassing piece
of legislation since the income tax."'2 The avowed purpose of OSHA is "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe
and healthful working conditions."' 3 Although this goal has been universally
applauded, the administration of the Act has been criticized for unduly
4
burdening affected businesses.
The key to the enforcement provisions of OSHA is the authority given to
the Secretary of Labor to make periodic inspections of business premises 5
and to issue citations for any violation of OSHA discovered during the
investigation. 6 Although OSHA apparently authorizes inspections to take
place without consent of the owner and without a search warrant, 7 this
authority has been recently challenged in the courts. At least three courts
have held that the fourth amendment s requires that the Act be read as
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970)).
2. The Effects of the Administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
on Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems
Affecting Small Business of the Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (statement of Rep. William L. Hungate) [hereinafter cited as
1974 Hearings].
3. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
4. See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra note 2, at 2-5 (testimony of Rep. William J.
Randall). Congress anticipated this problem and directed that any information
obtained "under this chapter shall be obtained with a minimum burden on employers
29 U.S.C.
.
§657(d) (1970).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where
work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other
reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines,
apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately
any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. §658 (1970).
7. See note 5 supra; see text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
8. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
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mandating that a warrant be obtained in order to conduct an inspection
without consent9 while one court has held that warrantless, consentless
inspections are reasonable and not proscribed by the Constitution. 10
The law on administrative searches is not settled but because of the allencompassing nature of OSHA it is likely that warrantless, consentless
inspections under the Act will not be upheld by the courts. This comment
will analyze the constitutionality of such inspections and propose a change
in the enforcement provisions of OSHA which might save the inspections
from unconstitutionality.
II.

OSHA

The Occupational Safety and Health Act is a federal law giving the
Secretary of Labor authority to promulgate mandatory safety and health
standards." It is applicable to every private employer in a business
affecting commerce.' 2 Employers not only must comply with specific
standards,' 3 they must also fulfill a broad general requirement to provide a
place of employment free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or
14
serious injury.
The enforcement of OSHA is carried out primarily by Compliance
Safety and Health Officers, 15 who are authorized to make inspections of
business premises covered by the Act.' 6 After an inspection, these officers
submit a report to the Area Director, who is required to issue a citation for
any non-de minimus violation of the Act or any standard promulgated
thereunder. 7 A penalty of up to $1,000 must be assessed for any serious
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
amend. IV.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court indicated that a standard somewhat lesser than the traditional probable cause
standard should be used in issuing warrants for administrative searches. The Court
noted that it would not be necessary to show that there is probable cause to believe
that a violation existed on the particular premises to be inspected but only that
reasonable administrative standards for conducting an area inspection were satisfied
with regard to a particular dwelling. Id. at 534-38.
9. Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1642 (1977); Brennan v. Gibson's Products,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). For a discussion of these cases, see text
accompanying notes 84-96 infra.
10. Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). For a
discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
11. 29 U.S.C. §655 (1970).
12. Id. § 652(5).
13. Id. § 654. Any person adversely affected by a standard promulgated under
OSHA may challenge the standard by filing a petition in a United States court of
appeals. Id. § 655(f).
14. Id. § 654(a).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1976).
16. Id. § 1903.21(d). Advance notice of inspections may not be given except in
limited circumstances where "the giving of advance notice would enhance the
probability of an effective and thorough inspection." Id. § 1903.6.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1903.14 (1976). De minimis violations result
in the issuance of a notice. Id.
U.S. CONST.
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violation for which a citation is issued,'8 and may be assessed for a violation
not of a serious nature. 19 Criminal sanctions are provided for a willful
violation which causes death to an employee."°
If, after notification that a penalty has been assessed against him, an
employer wishes to contest the citation or penalty, he must notify the
Secretary of Labor within fifteen days. 21 The dispute is then referred to the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission),22 which
makes findings of fact and then issues an order "affirming, modifying, or
vacating the ... citation or proposed penalty. ' 23 Any party adversely
affected by an order of the Commission may seek review in the United
State courts of appeals, but findings of fact made by the Commission are
24
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Inspections under the Act are conducted on a priority basis. 25 First
priority is given to investigations of catastrophes or fatalities. 26 Efforts are
next directed toward investigation of valid employee complaints. 27 Priority
is then given to inspections of "target industry and target health hazard
classifications." 28 Final priority is given to inspections of a random cross
section of businesses in the area. 29 If a Compliance Safety and Health
Officer is refused permission to conduct an inspection, he is directed to
report to the Area Director who "shall promptly take appropriate action,
including compulsory process, if necessary."' 3 It is against this background
that the constitutionality of the warrantless inspections must be viewed.
III.

HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES

The Supreme Court of the United States first considered the legality of
warrantless administrative searches in 1959 in Frank v. Maryland.31 The
18. 29 U.S.C. §666(b) (1970). A serious violation is defined as one that has a
substantial probability of resulting in death or serious physical harm. Id. § 666().
19. Id. § 666(c).
20. Id. § 666(e). OSHA provides for punishment by a fine of not more than $10,000
or imprisonment for not more than six months or both for a first time conviction, and
a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both
for any subsequent conviction. Id. For a discussion of the willfulness requirement
under this section, see United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78, 81-82 (10th
Cir. 1975).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970).
22. The three-member Commission is appointed by the President and has its
principal office in the District of Columbia. Id. § 661.
23. Id. § 659(c).
24. Id. §660; Accu-Namics, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 515 F.2d 828, 835 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
25. Heath, The Implementation and Philosophy of the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 FLA. L. REV. 249, 254 (1973).
26. Id.
27. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §657(f).
28. Heath, supra note 25, at 254.
29. Id.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1976).
31. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The appellant in Frank was arrested and fined for
refusing entry to a health inspector who was acting on a neighbor's complaint. Id. at
361-62. It was from a conviction for resisting the inspection that the appeal was
taken. Id. at 362.
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Court held in that case that the fourth amendment's protection was
applicable only in the area of criminal prosecutions. 3 2 Thus, the Court
concluded that no warrant was required for a health inspector to enter a
private residence in order "to determine whether conditions exist which the
'33
[city's] Health Code proscribes.
The distinction between civil and criminal investigations for fourth
amendment purposes was repudiated a short time later in the twin cases of
Camara v. Municipal Court34 and See v. City of Seattle.35 The defendant in
Camara, like his counterpart in Frank, was charged with refusing to allow
an inspection of his residence by city inspectors. 36 This time the Court held
that the fourth amendment barred the prosecution of an individual for
refusing to permit a warrantless administrative search.3 7 The Court found
"anomalous" the suggestion that "the individual and his private property
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior. '38 In See the Court held that the warrant
requirement is equally applicable to inspections of commercial enterprises.3 9
"The business man, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon
his private commercial property. '40 The Court did indicate in See, however,
that business premises might "reasonably be inspected in many more
'41
situations than private homes."
The distinction between private homes and business premises alluded to
in See was further delineated in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States.42 There Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared that a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code 43 which authorized warrantless
inspections of liquor dealers was not unconstitutional. 44 The Court
emphasized the fact that the regulation of the liquor industry predated the
32. Id. at 365-66. For the text of the fourth amendment, see note 8 supra.
33. 359 U.S. at 365-66.
34. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
35. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
36. 387 U.S. at 525. The case was an appeal from the denial of a writ of
prohibition. The appellant had sought to block his prosecution for violation of the San

Francisco Housing Code on the ground that the Code was unconstitutional on its face
because it authorized warrantless inspections. Id.
37. Id. at 540.
38. Id. at 530 (footnote omitted). The Court noted, however, that even if the fourth

amendment was limited to cases of criminal prosecution, the fact that the regulatory
laws at issue were enforced by criminal processes would have been a sufficient basis
for invoking the amendment's protections. Id. at 531.
39. 387 U.S. at 546.

40. Id. at 543.
41. Id. at 545-46. The Court made clear that its decision was not meant to
foreclose licensing schemes that require inspections "prior to operating a business or
marketing a product." Id. at 546.
42. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). Petitioner, a New York liquor licensee, brought suit in

federal district court to obtain the return of liquor seized by federal authorities and to
suppress it as evidence. The district court granted the relief sought but the court of
appeals reversed. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 7606.
44. 397 U.S. at 76. "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection

under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." Id.
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fourth amendment 45 and read the amendment in light of this practice at the
time of its enactment. 46 The forcible entry and search in Colonnade was
disapproved, however, since the statute did not directly authorize forcible
entry without a warrant but rather made refusal to grant admission the
47
offense.
The rationale of Colonnade was expanded by the Court in United States
v. Biswell,48 where the warrantless seach of a pawn shop that was licensed
to sell firearms was upheld as a reasonable incident of a legitimate licensing
scheme. 49 According to the Court, warrantless searches were necessary to
provide a credible deterrent to violations of the firearms legislation.5 It was
posited that by engaging in a pervasively regulated industry, dealers in
firearms had impliedly consented to such inspections.-'
Both Colonnade and Biswell upheld administrative inspections as
reasonable under the fourth amendment, but in Wyman v. James,52 the
Court indicated that under certain conditions an administrative entry may
not be a search at all, and thus not subject to fourth amendment
protections.53 In that case the Court held that the warrantless "visit" to the
home of a welfare recipient is not a search in the fourth amendment
meaning of that term.5 4 The majority reasoned that since the refusal to
allow the "visit" did not result in a forced entry5 5 and the recipient's denial
of permission to enter was not a criminal act, 56 the fourth amendment was
not applicable. The Court further added that even if the "visit" were
assumed to be a traditional search it did "not descend to the level of

45. Id. at 75.
46. Id. The Court noted that in 1791, the year that the fourth amendment was

written, Congress passed a tax act which gave federal officers the authority to inspect
liquor operations without a warrant. Id., citing Act of March 3, 1791, Ch. 15, § 29, 1
Stat. 206.
47. 397 U.S. at 77. See I.R.C. § 7342.
48. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
49. Id. at 315. The Court stated that "[i]n the context of a regulatory inspection
system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place and scope, the
legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute."

Id.
50. Id. at 316.
51. Id.
52. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
53. Id. at 317.
54. Id.
55. Id. The denial of entry, however, did result in the termination of welfare
benefits. Id. at 313-14. It has been held that a state may not condition a benefit upon
the waiver of a constitutional right. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (refusal to
work on Saturday due to religious beliefs could not be basis of denial of
unemployment benefits); Speiser v. Rondall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax
exemption based upon refusal to subscribe to oath that taxpayer would not advocate
overthrow of government is unconstitutional). These decisions have been held to be
applicable in the welfare context. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). Thus, the
fact that the refusal to allow the "visit" did not result in a forced entry should not be
relevant where the refusal does result in the denial of a benefit.
56. 400 U.S. at 317. The visit is, however, partially analogous to a criminal
investigation in that caseworkers are required to report any evidence of fraud that is
uncovered by a home visit. Id. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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unreasonableness. 5 7 The Court, in listing characteristics of the procedure
that were indicative of reasonableness, 58 stressed both the public interest in
''
the correct use of welfare funds5 9 and the benign purpose of the "visit. 60
In the wake of Colonnade and Biswell lower courts have tended to
uphold warrantless searches by administrative agencies. The courts have
emphasized that industries that are pervasively regulated do not have a
justifiable expectation of privacy sufficient to override an important
governmental interest in conducting a warrantless search. 61 Thus, a statute
that protects an important governmental interest and contains provisions
for warrantless searches will be held valid if there is little danger of abuse
62
and if having to obtain a warrant would frustrate the purpose of an act.
One court has stated that "[iln effect, the statute takes the place of a valid
'63
search warrant.
In light of this trend of the Supreme Court's to emphasize the exceptions
to warrant requirements, 64 it might be assumed that the earlier holdings of
Camara and See are in jeopardy. 65 Two recent decisions, however, may be
interpreted as a reaffirmation of the principle that warrantless searches
remain the exception and not the rule.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,66 the Supreme Court refused to
67
sanction warrantless searches of automobiles within a reasonable distance
of national borders although the searches were conducted pursuant to

57. Id. at 318.
58. Id., at 318-24. Among the factors the Court found to be indicative of
reasonableness were included the lack of alternative methods of gaining the
necessary information, the minimal burden that the visit entailed, and the stigma
that a warrant requirement would provide. Id.
59. Id., at 318-19.
60. The Court noted that the "caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a
friend to one in need." Id. at 323.
61. See, e.g., Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 49-51
(S.D. Ohio 1973); United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 143 (N.D.
Okla. 1973); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371, 1376-78
(D. Del. 1972). For an example of an opinion which upheld a warrantless search by a
state agency, see Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1974).
Prior to Colonnade and Biswell, courts had generally held that administrative
inspections were only valid if conducted pursuant to a search warrant or with the
consent of the inspected. See, e.g., United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. J. B. Kramer Grocery Co.,
418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969).
62. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio
1973); see also United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-38 (D.D.C. 1973).
63. United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 143 (N.D. Okla.
1973). The court was referring to provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act that permit warrantless inspections of businesses covered by it. Id. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 374 (1970).
64. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
65. For a discussion of how these recent Supreme Court decisions affect the
viability of Camara and See, see Rothstein and Rothstein, Administrative Searches
and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975).
66. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
67. Id. at 268. Reasonable distance is defined for these purposes as "within 100 air
miles from any external boundary of the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1976).
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provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.6s Relying on Camara,
the Court concluded that at least an area search warrant would be required
in order to conduct these close-to-border searches.6 9 "[T]he determination of
whether a warrant should be issued for an area search involves a balancing
of the legitimate interests of law enforcement with protected Fourth
Amendment rights."' 7 An attempt to justify the search on the basis of
Colonnade and Biswell was rejected.7 1 The Court distinguished those
decisions as being based upon the implied consent to inspection of a person
engaged in a pervasively regulated enterprise.7 2 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Powell - who found no such indication of implied consent in a
border search - stated that "[o]ne who merely travels in regions near the
borders of the country can hardly be thought to have submitted to
' 73
inspections in exchange for a special perquisite.
More recently, the Court has reiterated its continued support for Camara
and See in Air Pollution Variance Board u. Western Alfalfa Corp.74 This
1974 case approved the conduct of a health inspector who had entered the
outside premises of a factory to measure smoke emissions. 75 The Court
emphasized that the inspector did not enter any area that was not open to
the public 76 and refused to extend "the Fourth Amendment to sights seen in
'the open fields.'-77 The important aspect of the Court's opinion, for
purposes of this comment, is its expressly stated continued adherence to
Camara and See.

78

68. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorized warrantless searches of
"any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car,
aircraft, conveyance or vehicle" within a "reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
69. 413 U.S. at 270. In a concurring opinion Justice Powell outlined what he
perceived to be the correct factors to be considered when issuing an area search
warrant in border patrol cases:
(i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are known or
reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area;
(ii) the proximity of the area in question to the borders;
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the area, including
the roads therein and the extent of their use; and
(iv) the probable degree of interference with the rights of innocent persons,
taking into account the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and
the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general
traffic of the road or area.
Id. at 283-84 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 284.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 281 (Powell, J., concurring).
74. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
75. Id. at 863. The inspector was acting under the authority of a Colorado state
law, COLO. REV. STAT. § 66-29-5 (Supp. 1967), which required a trained inspector to
stand in a position where he had an unobstructed view of the smoke plume, and to
note the smoke according to the opacity scale of the Ringlemann Chart. 416 U.S. at
863.
76. 416 U.S. at 863-65.
77. Id. at 865 quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
78. 416 U.S. at 864. The Court noted, however, that Camara and See were not
applicable because no entry of buildings or inspection of documents was involved. Id.
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Due to the Court's recent reaffirmations of the policy behind Camara
and See, it appears that not all administrative searches can escape the
fourth amendment's warrant requirements. The determination of whether a
warrant will be required under OSHA should instead be made by balancing
79
the competing interests involved.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INSPECTIONS UNDER OSHA

The validity of warrantless searches under OSHA was first upheld in
Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc. 0 There, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia opined that the search was
reasonable in light of "the compelling need for unannounced inspections."sl
In the court's view, Camara and See had been severely restricted by the later
decisions in Colonnade and Biswell.82 It characterized the defendant
Buckeye Industries' reliance on the earlier cases as "constitutionally
'8 3
speaking, marching to the beat of an antique drum.
Buckeye Industries, however, was decided shortly before the Supreme
Court's decision in Western Alfalfa and has not been followed by other
federal district courts. In Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc.,84 the district
court for the Eastern District of Texas viewed recent Supreme Court
pronouncements as breathing new life into the Camara-See doctrine. 85 The
court opined that "since Western Alfalfa, it seems plain that the fourth
amendment is not to be viewed as in a condition of general retreat before an
administrative advance. '86 In examining the public interest in inspections
under OSHA, the court indicated that the generalized congressional findings

79. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment:
A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. REV.
1011 (1973). For a list of factors that have been applied by the Supreme Court in the
balancing process, see Note, Administrative Search Warrants,58 MINN. L. REV.607,
619 n.41 (1974).
80. 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). In this case, an Occupational Safety and
Health Compliance Officer was refused entry to the premises of Buckeye Industries.
The Secretary of Labor thereupon requested a court order directing the company to
submit to an inspection of the premises. Id. at 1351.
81. Id. at 1354. "The necessity of showing probable cause as a requisite would
serve to destroy the object of the legislation." Id. Accord, Youghiogheny and Ohio
Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973). For a discussion of the
probable cause standard applied in administrative searches, see note 8 supra.
82. 374 F. Supp. at 1355-56. Buckeye Industries preceded the Supreme Court's
reaffirmation of Camara and See in Western Alfalfa. See text accompanying notes
74-78 supra.
83. 374 F. Supp. at 1356.
84. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). The case arose when compliance officers
were refused permission to enter nonpublic portions of a store maintained by Gibson's
Products, Inc. The inspection was routine and not occasioned by any complaint. The
Secretary of Labor sought an order compelling Gibson's to submit to the inspection.
Id. at 155-56.
85. Id. at 159-61.
86. Id. at 161. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra. Reliance was also placed
on the Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973). See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss6/8

8

Martin: The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections

1222

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 22

were
which supported OSHA, although "entitled to the greatest deference,"
87
interests.
amendment
fourth
legitimate
outweigh
to
insufficient
The Gibson's Products reasoning was followed in Dunlop v. Hertzler
Enterprises,Inc.88 There the court stressed that the broad scope of OSHA
was fatal to the validity of warrantless searches.8 9 Because the Act applies
to virtually all business and is not limited to areas of pervasive regulation,
the Hertzler court decided it would be inappropriate to follow the ColonnadeBiswell line of cases ° As to the public interest in the challenged inspection,
the court wrote "it is not certain that inspection of Hertzler will advance the
urgent federal interest upon which the OSHA regulatory scheme is
premised." 91 Both Gibson's Products and Hertzler Enterprises found that
warrantless inspections were unconstitutional, but neither case declared the
inspection provisions 92 of OSHA unconstitutional. Rather, these courts
construed the inspection provisions to require a warrant. 93 In Barlow's, Inc.
u. Usery,94 however, the court declared that the inspection provisions could
not be fairly read to include a warrant requirement and refused to "judicially
redraft an enactment of Congress." 95 Accordingly, an extremely broad
96
injunction was issued prohibiting any inspection under OSHA.
87. 407 F. Supp. at 161. That the existence of more specific congressional findings
would have persuaded the court to uphold the inspections is illustrated by the Court's
comment that "[t]here the inroad [on fourth amendment safeguards] is narrow,
supported by clear congressional findings, and the object or practice to be regulated is
inherently dangerous and (perhaps or) traditionally regulated as in Colonnade and
Biswell, it is more likely to be tolerated." Id.
88. 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976). In this case, compliance officers sought and
obtained a search warrant from a United States Magistrate after having been refused
entry initially. The warrant contained no recital of probable cause, however, and the
officers were again refused entry when they attempted to serve it. Id. at 629. The court
noted that the warrant contained only a conclusory statement that reasonable
legislative and administrative standards authorized the inspection, id. at 629, n.3, but
failed to discuss whether a proper warrant could issue in the absence of information
as to probable violations on the particular premises involved. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967). According to the Camara Court,
"reasonableness is ... the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated, then there is probably cause to issue a suitable restricted
search warrant." Id. at 539.
89. Id. at 632.
90. Id. at 633.
91. Id. The fact that here there was no indication of any safety or health hazards
on the premises to be searched was contrasted with the situations in Colonnade and
Biswell where it was known that "'the concerns searched had on the premises and
dealt in the sensitive commodities - guns and liquors - which occasioned official
scrutiny."' Id. quoting Brennan v. Gibson's Products, 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (E.D. Tex.'
1976).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). For portions of the text of this section see note 5
supra.
93. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627, 634 (D.N.M. 1976);
Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (E.D. Tex. 1976). Both courts
noted that the legislative history on this point was inconclusive.
94. 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1642 (1977). Barlow's Inc. brought this action to enjoin
enforcement of the Act on the ground of repugnance to the fourth amendment after
the Secretary of Labor obtained a court order compelling Barlow's to allow entry,
inspection and investigation of its premises. Id. at 439.
95. 424 F. Supp. at 441.
96. Id.
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It is submitted that while the language Congress employed does not
suggest a warrant requirement, the intention of Congress can. better be
served by interpreting the provisions to save them from unconstitutionality.
The broad injunction issued in Barlow's Inc. effectively and unnecessarily
cripples the administration of OSHA, and ignores the principle of statutory
construction which requires a court to read an act, if possible, so as to avoid
a finding of unconstitutionality.9 7 The decision may prove useful, however,
since it will place pressure upon Congress to specify a clearly constitutional
method of enforcing OSHA.
V. A

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS INSPECTIONS

The courts which have denied the power to conduct warrantless
searches under OSHA have interpreted Colonnade and Biswell as being
narrow exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. They fail
to discuss, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman v. James.98The
Wyman Court was not dealing with a specialized and highly regulated
industry but rather with the broad field of public welfare. Its conclusion that
warrantless intrusions into the home of a welfare recipient were sanctioned
has an impact upon the entire system of governmental assistance.9 9 Thus, to
presume that warrantless inspections are valid only in the unique,
historically regulated fields of the liquor and fire-arms industries, or other
narrowly defined areas, is to overlook the full impact of Wyman. The
emphasis of Wyman on the beneficient object of the home visit indicated at
least a partial reaffirmation of the doctrine of Frank v. Maryland'°° which
posited that there is a constitutional distinction between criminal and civil
investigations. 101
97. This principle of construction was described by the court in Gibson'sProducts
as follows:
While we recognize that our approach is subject to criticism as remedial to
the verge of redrafting, if there is a plan for unusual deference anywhere in the
relations between the branches of our federal government it surely exists where a
court of first instance is required to pass upon the constitutionality of a broad
national enactment of the Congress.
Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 163 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
98. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra.
99. 400 U.S. at 326-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas commented on
the importance of governmental assistance in modern times:

We are living in a society where one of the most important forms of property

is government largesse which some call the "new property." The payrolls of
government are but one aspect of that "new property." Defense contracts,
highway contracts, and other multifarious forms of contracts are another part.
So are subsidies to air, rail, and other carriers. So are disbursements for scientific
research. So are TV and radio licenses to use air space which of course is part of
the public domain.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
100. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
101. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971). The Wyman Court did not
expressly rely upon Frank but it did state: "The home visit is not a criminal
investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and ... is not in aid of
any criminal proceeding." Id. But see note 56 supra.
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The omission of Wyman v. James in the courts' analyses, however, is
not fatal to the holdings of the OSHA cases. Even under the reasoning of
Wyman, it is probable that OSHA, as it is currently composed, cannot
constitutionally authorize warrantless inspections. 1°2 Whether the OSHA
penalty provisions are "civil" or "criminal" is a matter for dispute, 10 3 but it
is clear that the compliance officers are not looked upon as benefactors by
the businessmen affected. 04 The inspectors are not. employed as safety
advisors but rather are bound to issue a citation for any violation found.'05
The inspections are unannounced and uninvited.1° 6 They serve only the
government's enforcement interests. The Supreme Court's analysis in
Wyman - which relies on the benign character of the welfare visit ' °7 - is,
therefore, not presently applicable. It is submitted, however, that if OSHA
were changed so that an inspector's function more closely resembled that of
a consultant than that of a policeman, a sufficient analogy would be created.
Although numerous amendments have been proposed that would
provide for on-site consultation by OSHA employees, these attempts have
treated the consultants as separate from and in addition to the present
compliance officers. 08 In order to have an effect upon the constitutionality
of warrantless inspections, any change must be in the form of a
modification of present inspection practices. If the purpose of the inspection
was geared to advice, instead of punishment, the rationale of Wyman would
permit inspections without warrants. More importantly, however, this
change in procedure would eliminate the resentment that coercive, punitive
enforcement of OSHA has generated. The resulting spirit of cooperation
would better serve the policies behind OSHA and would be more conducive
to the promotion of safe working conditions than the present atmosphere of
mutual distrust between government and industry. 10 9
102. One confident commentator has gone so far as to state that "this conclusion
seems so clearly correct that little would be served by extended discussion of this
much-considered question ..
" Currie, OSHA, 1976 A. B. F. RES. J. 1107, 1159.
103. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd
97 S. Ct. 1261 (1977) (holding that OSHA is not a penal statute requiring the
constitutional protections available in criminal proceeding).
104. See generally 1974 Hearings, supra note 2.
105. The Department of Labor has interpreted OSHA "to mandate that the
authorized representative of the Secretary, after inspecting worksites and observing
any violations, must issue appropriate citations." On-Site Consultation Hearings,
OccupationalSafety and Health Act: Hearings on H.R. 8618 Before the Subcomm. on
Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety of the House Comm. On Education
and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].See 29
U.S.C. §658(a) (1970); notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6 (1976). See note 16 supra.
107. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
108. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 105, at 2-3. The purpose of the
amendment discussed therein has been described as "to strengthen OSHA by
providing an additional program to encourage employers to voluntarily comply with
safety and health standards established under the act. [It] will not weaken the vital
enforcement provisions of OSHA, including first-instance sanctions." Id. at 1.
109. That the present enforcement provisions are not conducive to cooperation is
evidenced by the following comment:
Engineers firmly believe that voluntary compliance can best implement the
intent of OSHA. Experience has demonstrated that skepticism concerning
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Inspections under a revised procedure could be initiated in two ways,
either by a request from an employer, or at the instigation of the
government. Obviously, there is no problem with the fourth amendment
when an employer requests an inspection. 110 It may also be presumed that
the fourth amendment would not bar a reasonable inspection even without
consent of the employer. If the inspection does not result in the imposition of
a penalty but rather confers the benefit of free safety consultation, the
fourth amendment should not operate to frustrate a laudable governmental
policy.
Employers, it is recognized, will not always heed the instructions of
OSHA consultants even when the employer has requested the inspection."'
Thus, some enforcement mechanism will always be required. It is
envisioned, however, that the enforcement objectives could be accomplished
within the traditional strictures of the fourth amendment. Employee
complaints would furnish ample justification for obtaining a warrant.
Furthermore, the probable cause requirement for obtaining administrative
search warrants is far less burdensome than it is in the traditional criminal
context and, thus, it should not be an inordinate handicap to OSHA
1 2
administrators.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Effective implementation of the regulations promulgated under OSHA
should go a long way toward assuring "every working man and woman in
the nation safe and healthful working conditions." The universal scope of
OSHA,. however, requires that the constitutional protections against
unreasonable governmental interference with private activities be honored.
In order to achieve that end, OSHA must be structured for administration by
government and industry in voluntary cooperation. Thus, the emphasis that
is presently placed upon coercion and penalty should be replaced by a
statutorily implemented emphasis upon advice and consultation.
Thomas Martin;
OSHA's worth has arisen out of the enforcement activities of the Act; indeed,
downright rejection has appeared in many instances. And this enforcement has
even developed fear and indignation by many businessmen toward OSHA ...
On-site consultation visits will provide a giant step forward toward voluntary
compliance.
1975 Hearings,supra note 105, at 29 (statement of Benjamin Rocuskie, spokesman for
The National Society of Professional Engineers).
110. See Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 88 (5th Cir.
1975). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

111. As one involved spokesman has observed: "Organized labor remembers only
too clearly that consultations without enforcement was the principal highway
traveled by the state occupational safety and health programs before the 1970 act
became law. The resultant failure of that approach is the principal reason we have
OSHA today." 1975 Hearings, supra note 105, at 100 (statement of F. Howard
McGuigan, Legislative Representative A.F.L./C.I.O.).
112. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967); note 8 supra. See
also Currie, supra note 102 at 1159.
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